The most interesting public affairs event of last week for me was the conflict between Gergely Karácsony and Péter Magyar, because this is the first manifestation since the election of the political game that will likely be decisive over the next four years.
Péter Magyar will strive to keep as many voters as possible within the Tisza camp, which, according to the latest Medián poll, has swollen to 66 percent and will probably begin to decline soon after its growth in the first weeks. By now, this voter base has become quite distinctive: it consists of three main parts.
1.) Primary Tisza voters (core voters): roughly half of those who voted for Tisza in the election (53%), that is, 26.5%.
2.) Not Tisza voters, but regime-change voters: the other half of those who voted for Tisza in the election, also 26.5%.
Péter Magyar will strive to keep as many voters as possible within the Tisza camp, which, according to the latest Medián poll, has swollen to 66 percent and will probably begin to decline soon after its growth in the first weeks. By now, this voter base has become quite distinctive: it consists of three main parts.
1.) Primary Tisza voters (core voters): roughly half of those who voted for Tisza in the election (53%), that is, 26.5%.
2.) Not Tisza voters, but regime-change voters: the other half of those who voted for Tisza in the election, also 26.5%.
3.) Fidesz voters who became “Tisza supporters” after the election victory (bandwagoners, “awakened ones”): they are why the camp grew to 66%. They make up 13% of decided likely voters (66–53).
The dynamics of these groups will be an important question over the next four years, and Gergely Karácsony has now entered the arena to shape them—whether consciously or accidentally (in my view, rather consciously)—by organizing a separate event to celebrate the regime-change victory. Moreover, he “triggered” Péter Magyar both with the timing (announcing it for one day before the Tisza event) and the venue (near the location of the Tisza event).
If this was deliberate provocation on Gergely Karácsony's part, then it can be considered a complete success from two perspectives.
1.) He himself probably did not expect Péter Magyar to lose his temper to such an extent and even mock the capital's near-bankruptcy situation in his outraged comment. In doing so, Péter Magyar moved closer to the Fidesz narrative and provided Gergely Karácsony with a comfortable position.
2.) Neither of them probably expected such a large share of the audience to side with Gergely Karácsony. Gratitude toward the regime-changing Péter Magyar apparently does not expand his room for maneuver to the extent expected.
It is surprising how strict—or at least not so forgiving—the online audience is toward Péter Magyar in this case. I think the reason is the unfavorable contrast. Péter Magyar's overwhelming political style and confrontational, at times arrogant communication strongly recall what we have become accustomed to from Fidesz. However, this was not a problem as long as Péter Magyar, in functional terms, was a “weapon” against Fidesz in the eyes of voters. With Fidesz's fall, however, the arrogance associated with this political culture has also somewhat “fallen,” and in contrast, the consensual, calm political character embodied by Gergely Karácsony may have gained value.
Overall, then, this minor clash can be interpreted as Gergely Karácsony beginning to peel regime-change voters away from the Tisza Party: that approximately 26.5% whose primary motivation on April 12 was not Péter Magyar's person or the quality of the party, but regime change.
At the same time, an even more interesting phenomenon is unfolding: it is possible that, with the attrition of regime-change voters and the further erosion of Fidesz, Tisza's voter base will partly be replaced. The proportion of bandwagoners (“awakened ones”) may increase, while the weight of regime-change voters declines.
The dynamics of these groups will be an important question over the next four years, and Gergely Karácsony has now entered the arena to shape them—whether consciously or accidentally (in my view, rather consciously)—by organizing a separate event to celebrate the regime-change victory. Moreover, he “triggered” Péter Magyar both with the timing (announcing it for one day before the Tisza event) and the venue (near the location of the Tisza event).
If this was deliberate provocation on Gergely Karácsony's part, then it can be considered a complete success from two perspectives.
1.) He himself probably did not expect Péter Magyar to lose his temper to such an extent and even mock the capital's near-bankruptcy situation in his outraged comment. In doing so, Péter Magyar moved closer to the Fidesz narrative and provided Gergely Karácsony with a comfortable position.
2.) Neither of them probably expected such a large share of the audience to side with Gergely Karácsony. Gratitude toward the regime-changing Péter Magyar apparently does not expand his room for maneuver to the extent expected.
It is surprising how strict—or at least not so forgiving—the online audience is toward Péter Magyar in this case. I think the reason is the unfavorable contrast. Péter Magyar's overwhelming political style and confrontational, at times arrogant communication strongly recall what we have become accustomed to from Fidesz. However, this was not a problem as long as Péter Magyar, in functional terms, was a “weapon” against Fidesz in the eyes of voters. With Fidesz's fall, however, the arrogance associated with this political culture has also somewhat “fallen,” and in contrast, the consensual, calm political character embodied by Gergely Karácsony may have gained value.
Overall, then, this minor clash can be interpreted as Gergely Karácsony beginning to peel regime-change voters away from the Tisza Party: that approximately 26.5% whose primary motivation on April 12 was not Péter Magyar's person or the quality of the party, but regime change.
At the same time, an even more interesting phenomenon is unfolding: it is possible that, with the attrition of regime-change voters and the further erosion of Fidesz, Tisza's voter base will partly be replaced. The proportion of bandwagoners (“awakened ones”) may increase, while the weight of regime-change voters declines.